

Message Text

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DRAFTED BY:EUR/NE:RLFUNSEITH
APPROVED BY:S/S-SGOLDSMITH
T:BENSON
PM:RERICSON
EUR/RDVINE
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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PEPR, MASS, SW, IN, US, PK

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SWEDISH COMMERCE
MINISTER ON US DENIAL OF VIGGEN SALE TO INDIA

1. SUMMARY: DURING A ONE-HOUR DISCUSSION AUGUST 2 WITH
SWEDISH COMMERCE MINISTER BURENSTAM LINDER ON THE US
DECISION NOT TO PERMIT SWEDEN TO CONCLUDE AN ARRANGEMENT
FOR THE SALE OF VIGGEN AIRCRAFT TO INDIA, THE SECRETARY
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RECONFIRMED THIS DECISION, STATING WE COULD NOT APPROVE
THE SALE BECAUSE WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD HAVE A
DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON SOUTH ASIA. BURENSTAM LINDER
RESTATED THE SWEDISH POSITION THAT: PAKISTAN ALREADY
HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT THAN THE VIGGEN --
INDIA HAS DECIDED TO OBTAIN A NEW AIRCRAFT WHETHER FROM
SWEDEN OR SOME OTHER SOURCE -- AND THAT THE US DENIAL
WILL SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE SWEDEN'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN AN
EFFECTIVE DETERRENT. END SUMMARY.

2. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION
THAT THE SECRETARY COULD SQUEEZE THIS MEETING IN HIS
ALREADY VERY CROWDED SCHEDULE. BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION
HE SAID THAT THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM POSED BY THE US DENIAL

OF THE VIGGEN RE-EXPORT PERMIT FORMS PART OF A GENERAL PROBLEM FOR A COUNTRY SUCH AS SWEDEN WHICH HAS TO LIVE BY ITS EXPORTS. THEREFORE SUCH ISSUES TAKE ON GREAT IMPORTANCE. AS FOR THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF THE PROPOSED SALE OF VIGGEN AIRCRAFT TO INDIA, SWEDEN MAINTAINS A CERTAIN LEVEL OF EXPORTS OF SWEDISH-MANUFACTURED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. SWEDEN CANNOT MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE WITHOUT SUCH EXPORTS AND IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR SWEDEN TO MAINTAIN OR SUSTAIN ITS OWN DEFENSE EFFORT WITHOUT ITS PRESENT DOMESTIC DEFENSE INDUSTRY. SWEDEN APPLIES VERY STRICT EXPORT CONTROLS ON THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT ABROAD AND THEY REGULARLY TURN DOWN REQUESTS FOR EXPORT ORDERS. THIS RESTRAINT MEANS THAT SWEDEN HAS GREAT SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE US POLICY OF ARMS RESTRAINT AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE SUBCONTINENT. HOWEVER, WITHIN SWEDEN'S OWN VERY RESTRICTIVE RULES ON MILITARY EXPORTS, THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT CONCLUDED THAT AN EXPORT PERMIT FOR THE SALE OF THE VIGGEN TO INDIA SHOULD BE GRANTED

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FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: (A) SWEDEN'S HISTORY OF COOPERATION WITH INDIA; (B) INDIA IS PRESENTLY THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY; (C) THE SALE OF THE VIGGEN CONSTITUTES A REPLACEMENT RATHER THAN AN ADDITION TO THE INDIAN AIR FORCE; (D) PAKISTAN ALREADY HAS IN ITS INVENTORY A MORE SOPHISTICATED AIRPLANE THAN THE VIGGEN; (E) INDIA HAS DECIDED TO OBTAIN A NEW JET AIRCRAFT WHETHER FROM SWEDEN, UK, FRANCE OR EVEN THE SOVIET UNION. BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF INDIA HAD TOLD HIM PERSONALLY THAT THERE WAS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THAT INDIA WOULD PURCHASE THE VIGGEN.

3. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID IT WAS SWEDEN'S UNDERSTANDING WHEN IT FIRST CONTRACTED TO BUY THE PRATT-WHITNEY ENGINE IN 1962 THAT IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME EXPORT OF THE AIRCRAFT IN WHICH IT WAS INSTALLED. THEREFORE SWEDEN HAD EXPECTED AN APPROVAL OF ITS REQUEST AND RECEIVED OUR NEGATIVE DECISION OF JULY 6 WITH GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT. SWEDEN OF COURSE WOULD NOT ARGUE THAT THE US SHOULD PERMIT A SWEDISH COMPANY TO SELL AN AIRPLANE IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT WOULD NOT PERMIT A US COMPANY TO SELL A COMPARABLE AIRPLANE. HOWEVER, THE EFFECT ON SWEDEN'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE SWEDISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY IS VERY SERIOUS. THE NEGATIVE US DECISION HAS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WHOLE FUTURE VIABILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT SWEDISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY. APPROVAL OF THIS SALE WOULD RELIEVE THE STRAIN ON SWEDEN'S DEFENSE BUDGET. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US NEGATIVE DECISION, IF IT STANDS, WILL HAVE VERY

SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ABILITY OF SWEDEN TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT CAPACITY TO CONTINUE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR SUCCESSOR AIRCRAFT. THE US NEGATIVE DECISION, BY PREVENTING THE SALE OF VIGGEN TO INDIA, WILL ALSO RE-
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DUCE THE RESOURCES SWEDEN HAS AVAILABLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS OWN DEFENSE INDUSTRY AS WELL AS INCREASING THE COST OF SWEDISH DEFENSE. THE US DECISION, MOREOVER, RISKS HAVING AN ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION BECAUSE IT SUGGESTS THAT THE SWEDISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY IS NOT REALLY INDEPENDENT AND THEREFORE CONTINUED SWEDISH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HIGH DEFENSE EXPENDITURES COULD BE JEOPARDIZED. IF AS A RESULT OF THE US DECISION, SWEDEN IS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY, THERE WILL BE LESS RESOURCES GOING INTO THE MAINTENANCE OF SWEDISH AERIAL DEFENSE. SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION WOULD PROBABLY NOT PERMIT A SWEDISH GOVERNMENT TO SPEND THE SAME AMOUNT OF MONEY TO PURCHASE FOREIGN MILITARY AIRCRAFT AS IT IS FOR THE PURCHASE OF SWEDISH-MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT.

4. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER STATED FURTHER THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE NORTHERN FLANK IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT BUT POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND THAT THE PRESENT SWEDISH DEFENSE EFFORT IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION IN STABILIZING THE NORTHERN FLANK. HE MENTIONED FINLAND AS A COUNTRY AFFECTED BY THE MAINTENANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE SWEDISH DETERRENT. THEREFORE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE US DECISION EXTEND BEYOND ITS EFFECT ON ONE SWEDISH EXPORT ORDER. THE US NEGATIVE DECISION HAS ALREADY GIVEN RISE TO SOME BITTERNESS AMONG THOSE INFLUENTIAL SWEDISH SECTORS WHO NOT ONLY SUPPORT A CONTINUED SWEDISH DEFENSE EFFORT BUT ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND SWEDEN. UNFORTUNATELY, THE US DECISION COMES AT A CRUCIAL POINT IN SWEDEN WHEN IMPORTANT DEFENSE DECISIONS ARE BEING MADE.

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5. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE US DECISION TO DENY THE SWEDISH REQUEST WAS VERY DIFFICULT AND THAT WE HAD DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TO THOUGHT AND ANALYSIS BEFORE MAKING THE DECISION. HE RECALLED HIS DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SODER BEFORE WE CAME TO A DECISION AND HIS POINTING OUT TO HER THE DIFFICULTIES THE SWEDISH REQUEST POSED FOR US. HE REASSURED MR. BURENSTAM LINDER OF OUR SENSITIVITY TO

THE SWEDISH POSITION AND OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REPERCUSSIONS IT WOULD HAVE IN SWEDEN. HE RESTATED

HOW THE US SEES THE PROBLEM, AS FOLLOWS: WE, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, ARE DOUBLY CONCERNED ABOUT ANY MOVES IN THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT AREA WHICH WOULD HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON SOUTH ASIA. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE REVERSED THE PROPOSED SALE OF THE US A-7 JET AIRCRAFT TO PAKISTAN. WE THOUGHT SUCH A SALE WOULD BE A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR US TO TURN AROUND THIS DECISION. FOR THE US NOW TO AGREE TO A SALE WHICH WOULD GIVE INDIA A CAPABILITY WHICH WE ARE DENYING PAKISTAN WOULD BE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THIS DECISION AND WITH OUR POLICY. WE HAVE TOLD THE INDIANS THEY ARE MAKING A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN BUYING SUCH A MODERN AIRCRAFT FROM SWEDEN, FRANCE OR THE UK. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THEM THAT PAKISTAN WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BUY A NEW AIRCRAFT TO OFFSET THE INDIAN ACQUISITION. THE RESULT WILL BE THAT BOTH SIDES WILL SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE THIS NEW PENETRATION CAPACITY. FOR THESE REASONS WE REGRETFULLY DECIDED WE WOULD DISAPPROVE THE SWEDISH REQUEST. WE WISH WE COULD SEE ANOTHER WAY AROUND IT BUT WE DON'T. WE ARE FULLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE SWEDISH CONCERNS BUT WE SEE NO BASIS FOR MOVING AWAY FROM OUR DECISION. THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY BENSON NOTED THAT IN OUR JUDGEMENT PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE AN AIRCRAFT COMPARABLE OR SUPERIOR TO THE VIGGEN.

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6. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID HE WAS GLAD TO SEE RECOGNITION FOR THE USEFUL ROLE SWEDEN PLAYS IN STABILIZING THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN FLANK. CONSIDERING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE BOTH COUNTRIES ATTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE EFFORT IN THE NORTH HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD FIND SOME WAY OUT OF THIS IMPASSE. (IN AN ASIDE, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID HE HAD SEEN A REPORT THAT THE US WAS CONSIDERING SELLING THE A-4 TO PAKISTAN. UNDER SECRETARY BENSON SAID THIS REPORT WAS WRONG AND THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT WE HAVE ONLY GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO SELLING THE F-5 TO PAKISTAN.) MR. BURENSTAM LINDER REPEATED THAT THE US NEGATIVE ATTITUDE HAS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDEN'S DEFENSE EFFORT, BOTH IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUN AND WILL CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN US-SWEDISH RELATIONS. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE US COULD DECLASSIFY THE PRATT-WHITNEY ENGINE WHICH HE NOTED HAS BEEN SOLD IN MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING INDIA, FOR USE IN CIVILIAN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. IF SWEDEN HAD KNOWN AT THE TIME THAT IT WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN EXPORT SALES OF A SWEDISH AIRCRAFT POWERED BY AN

"AMERICAN CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT ENGINE" THEY COULD HAVE SELECTED AN ENGINE FROM A DIFFERENT SOURCE. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN

THE US DECISION TO THE SWEDISH PUBLIC CONSIDERING
THE US RECOGNITION OF ITS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR
SWEDEN.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PROBLEM IS THAT WE ARE
CONFRONTED WITH TWO CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES. ONE IS
THE PRINCIPLE OF INTRODUCING A NEW MILITARY CAPABILITY
IN THE SUBCONTINENT AND THE OTHER PRINCIPLE IS US
SUPPORT FOR THE SWEDISH DEFENSE EFFORT. UNDER
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SECRETARY BENSON ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM ISN'T THE
ENGINE -- WHETHER IT IS MILITARY OR CIVILIAN -- THE
PROBLEM IS WHAT KIND OF AIRCRAFT THE ENGINE POWERS.
WHEN SWEDEN SIGNED THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT WITH PRATT-
WHITNEY NO ONE COULD HAVE KNOWN WHAT KIND OF AIR
FRAME IT MIGHT BE USED IN YEARS LATER OR WHERE IT
WOULD BE USED. THE PROBLEM FOR THE US IS THAT WE
WOULD NOT APPROVE THE EXPORT OF A SIMILAR US-BUILT
AIRCRAFT, THEREFORE WE CANNOT APPROVE ANOTHER COUNTRY
EXPORTING A SIMILAR AIRCRAFT POWERED BY THE US ENGINE.

8. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID THAT IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE FOR A COUNTRY AS SMALL AS SWEDEN TO HAVE
THE CAPACITY TO MANUFACTURE MILITARY AIRCRAFT IF IT
DID NOT HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME EXPORT SALES.
THIS IS WHY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT REQUESTED THAT HE
MEET WITH THE SECRETARY AT THIS TIME, WITH THE HOPE
THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO DECLASSIFY
THIS ENGINE.

9. UNDER SECRETARY BENSON SAID THE PRATT-WHITNEY
ENGINE IS ON THE US MUNITIONS CONTROL LIST AND THERE
IS NO POSSIBILITY OF REMOVING IT. THE ISSUE IS THE
END USE OF THE ENGINE. IF IT WAS BEING USED IN A
CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM.

10. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID THE US REPLY TO HIS
PRESENTATION WAS VERY DISAPPOINTING. HE ASKED AGAIN
WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT WE COULD REVIEW
OUR DECISION.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID NO.

12. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER NOTED OUR RESPONSE WITH GREAT
REGRET BECAUSE IT SPELLS THE END OF ANY CHANCES SWEDEN
MIGHT HAVE OF SELLING THE VIGGEN TO INDIA. HE WONDERED
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WHETHER CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE SUBCONTINENT COULD CHANGE

SO THAT WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES COMING TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION AND IF THIS IS THE CASE THEN SWEDEN WOULD RESERVE ITS POSITION AND MAY RESUBMIT A REQUEST AT A LATER TIME.

13. THE SECRETARY REPLIED WE DO NOT EXPECT THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CHANGE AND THEREFORE WE COULD NOT OFFER SWEDEN ANY ENCOURAGEMENT ON THIS POINT. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID THAT NONETHELESS, IN DISCUSSING THIS MEETING WITH THE SWEDISH PRESS HE WOULD LIKE TO REPORT THAT IN ADDITION TO PRESENTING THE SWEDISH POSITION TO THE SECRETARY, HE ALSO HAD STATED THAT SWEDEN RESERVED ITS POSITION ON RESUBMITTING ITS REQUEST SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE MINISTER MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT.

14. TURNING TO THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER WONDERED WHETHER THE PRESENT NEGATIVE DECISION HAD ANY IMPLICATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE US ATTITUDE ON SUBSEQUENT SWEDISH REQUESTS TO SELL SWEDEN'S PRODUCTS CONTAINING US COMPONENTS.

15. THE SECRETARY SAID THE QUESTION OF THE REEXPORT OF US COMPONENTS ARISES IN TWO KINDS OF TRANSACTIONS: THE FIRST WHEN THEY ARE PART OF MILITARY SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE VIGGEN AND THE SECOND WHEN THEY INVOLVE THE EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY OF VARYING TYPES IN NON-MILITARY SYSTEMS SUCH AS COMPUTERS. THE CRITERION THAT WE APPLY IS WHETHER THE REEXPORT OF THE US TECHNOLOGY WILL HAVE ANY ADVERSE EFFECT ON US NATIONAL SECURITY.

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APART FROM THAT CONSIDERATION, THE US AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY ENCOURAGES EXPORTS. UNDER SECRETARY COOPER ADDED THAT THE US COORDINATES THIS POLICY WITH THE OTHER LEADING SUPPLIERS IN NATO THROUGH THE COCOM MECHANISM. OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS THAT THE SALE OF TECHNOLOGY, PRINCIPALLY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, DOES NOT ADVERSELY EFFECT OUR SECURITY.

16. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER STATED THAT BECAUSE US POLICY ON AUTHORIZING REEXPORT IS SIGNIFICANT TO SWEDEN AND THIS IS WHY SWEDEN IS CONCERNED ABOUT US CRITERIA. SWEDISH COMPANIES HAVE BEEN REPORTING THAT THEY ARE EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING DECISIONS ON APPLICATIONS. THERE IS A LONG DELAY IN

GETTING A DECISION. IN A FREE MARKET SYSTEM SWEDISH COMPANIES HAVE THE OPTION TO LOOK ELSEWHERE IF THEY FIND THE AMERICAN PROCEDURES TOO CUMBERSOME.

17. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SWEDISH POINT OF VIEW. WE WOULD SOON COMPLETE A REVIEW OF THESE PROCEDURES. WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO MAKE OUR DECISIONS IN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME.

18. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID SWEDEN ALSO HOPES VERY MUCH THAT THE REVIEW OF US PROCEDURES WILL RESULT IN EXPEDITING THE PROCESS BUT ALSO HOPES THAT THE OUTCOME OF SUCH A REVIEW WOULD NOT BE A FURTHER TIGHTENING OF THE CRITERIA. TO UNDER SECRETARY COOPER'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE SWEDES DISCERNED THAT OUR PROCEDURES HAD BECOME WORSE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS THAN EARLIER, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER RESPONDED THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT SWEDISH COMPANIES WERE NOW EXPERIENCING GREATER DIFFICULTY. UNDER SECRETARY BENSON COMMENTED THAT THE INCREASED SOPHISTICATION OF WHAT WE ARE NOW SELLING
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MAY CAUSE A DELAY IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS BECAUSE IT IS SIMPLY MORE DIFFICULT TO ANALYZE THE IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED SALES INVOLVING HIGH TECHNOLOGY.

19. RETURNING TO THE DENIAL OF THE VIGGEN REQUEST, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER ENDED THE MEETING BY STATING HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD WOULD BE MUCH BETTER OFF IF THE US DECISION RESULTS -- AS IT APPEARS IT WILL 7- IN INDIA OBTAINING THE JAGUAR AIRCRAFT FROM BRITAIN WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZING SWEDEN'S DEFENSE EFFORT.

20. MINISTER BURENSTAM LINDER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR WACHTMEISTER, SWEDISH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR THYBERG AND SWEDISH EMBASSY ECONOMIC COUNSELOR DINKELSPIEL. IN ADDITION TO THE SECRETARY, THE US PARTICIPANTS WERE: UNDER SECRETARY COOPER, UNDER SECRETARY BENSON, EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VINE, PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR ERICSON AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR FUNSETH. VANCE

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S E C R E T STATE 196722

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 196722 ACTION STOCKHOLM DATED AUG 03:

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6. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID HE WAS GLAD TO SEE RECOGNITION FOR THE USEFUL ROLE SWEDEN PLAYS IN STABILIZING THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN FLANK. CONSIDERING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE BOTH COUNTRIES ATTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE EFFORT IN THE NORTH HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD FIND SOME WAY OUT OF THIS IMPASSE. (IN AN ASIDE, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID HE HAD SEEN A REPORT THAT THE US WAS CONSIDERING SELLING THE A-4 TO PAKISTAN. UNDER SECRETARY BENSON SAID THIS REPORT WAS WRONG AND THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT WE HAVE ONLY GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO SELLING THE F-5 TO PAKISTAN.) MR. BURENSTAM LINDER REPEATED THAT THE US NEGATIVE ATTITUDE HAS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDEN'S DEFENSE EFFORT, BOTH IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUN AND WILL CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN US-SWEDISH RELATIONS. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE US COULD DECLASSIFY THE PRATT-WHITNEY ENGINE WHICH HE NOTED HAS BEEN SOLD IN MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING INDIA, FOR USE IN CIVILIAN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. IF SWEDEN HAD KNOWN AT THE TIME THAT IT WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN EXPORT SALES OF A SWEDISH AIRCRAFT POWERED BY AN

"AMERICAN CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT ENGINE" THEY COULD HAVE SELECTED AN ENGINE FROM A DIFFERENT SOURCE. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN THE US DECISION TO THE SWEDISH PUBLIC CONSIDERING THE US RECOGNITION OF ITS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDEN.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PROBLEM IS THAT WE ARE

CONFRONTED WITH TWO CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES. ONE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INTRODUCING A NEW MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE SUBCONTINENT AND THE OTHER PRINCIPLE IS US SUPPORT FOR THE SWEDISH DEFENSE EFFORT. UNDER SECRETARY BENSON ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM ISN'T THE SECRET

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ENGINE -- WHETHER IT IS MILITARY OR CIVILIAN -- THE PROBLEM IS WHAT KIND OF AIRCRAFT THE ENGINE POWERS. WHEN SWEDEN SIGNED THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT WITH PRATT-WHITNEY NO ONE COULD HAVE KNOWN WHAT KIND OF AIRFRAME IT MIGHT BE USED IN YEARS LATER OR WHERE IT WOULD BE USED. THE PROBLEM FOR THE US IS THAT WE WOULD NOT APPROVE THE EXPORT OF A SIMILAR US-BUILT AIRCRAFT, THEREFORE WE CANNOT APPROVE ANOTHER COUNTRY EXPORTING A SIMILAR AIRCRAFT POWERED BY THE US ENGINE.

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9. UNDER SECRETARY BENSON SAID THE PRATT-WHITNEY ENGINE IS ON THE US MUNITIONS CONTROL LIST AND THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF REMOVING IT. THE ISSUE IS THE END USE OF THE ENGINE. IF IT WAS BEING USED IN A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM.O

10. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID THE US REPLY TO HIS PRESENTATION WAS VERY DISAPPOINTING. HE ASKED AGUIN WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT WE COULD REVIEW OUR DECISION.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID NO.

12. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER NOTED OUR RESPONSE WITH GREAT REGRET BECAUSE IT SPELLS THE END OF ANY CHANCES SWEDEN MIGHT HAVE OF SELLING THE VIGGEN TO INDIA. HE WONDERED

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WHETHER CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE SUBCONTINENT COULD CHANGE SO THAT WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES COMING TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION AND IF THIS IS THE CASE THEN SWEDEN WOULD RESERVE ITS POSITION AND MAY RESUBMIT A REQUEST AT A LATER TIME.

13. THE SECRETARY REPLIED WE DO NOT EXPECT THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CHANGE AND THEREFORE WE COULD NOT OFFER SWEDEN ANY ENCOURAGEMENT ON THIS POINT. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID THAT NONETHELESS, IN DISCUSSING THIS MEETING WITH THE SWEDISH PRESS HE WOULD LIKE TO REPORT THAT IN ADDITION TO PRESENTING THE SWEDISH POSITION TO THE SECRETARY, HE ALSO HAD STATED THAT SWEDEN RESERVED ITS POSITION ON RESUBMITTING ITS REQUEST SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE MINISTER MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT.

14. TURNING TO THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER WONDERED WHETHER THE PRESENT NEGATIVE DECISION HAD ANY IMPLICATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE US ATTITUDE ON SUBSEQUENT SWEDISH REQUESTS TO SELL SWEDEN'S PRODUCTS CONTAINING US COMPONENTS.

15. THE SECRETARY SAID THE QUESTION OF THE REEXPORT OF US COMPONENTS ARISES IN TWO KINDS OF TRANSACTIONS: THE FIRST WHEN THEY ARE PART OF MILITARY SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE VIGGEN AND THE SECOND WHEN THEY INVOLVE THE EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY OF VARYING TYPES IN NON-MILITARY SYSTEMS SUCH AS COMPUTERS. THE CRITERION THAT WE APPLY IS WHETHER THE REEXPORT OF THE US TECHNOLOGY WILL HAVE ANY ADVERSE EFFECT ON US NATIONAL SECURITY. APART FROM THAT CONSIDERATION, THE US AS A MATTER OF SECRET

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GENERAL POLICY ENCOURAGES EXPORTS. UNDER SECRETARY COOPER ADDED THAT THE US COORDINATES THIS POLICY WITH THE OTHER LEADING SUPPLIERS IN NATO THROUGH THE COCOM MECHANISM. OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS THAT THE SALE OF TECHNOLOGY, PRINCIPALLY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, DOES NOT ADVERSELY EFFECT OUR SECURITY.

16. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER STATED THAT BECAUSE US POLICY ON AUTHORIZING REEXPORT IS SIGNIFICANT TO SWEDEN AND THIS IS WHY SWEDEN IS CONCERNED ABOUT US CRITERIA. SWEDISH COMPANIES HAVE BEEN REPORTING THAT THEY ARE EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING DECISIONS ON APPLICATIONS. THERE IS A LONG DELAY IN GETTING A DECISION. IN A FREE MARKET SYSTEM SWEDISH COMPANIES HAVE THE OPTION TO LOOK ELSEWHERE IF THEY FIND THE AMERICAN PROCEDURES TOO CUMBERSOME.

17. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SWEDISH POINT OF VIEW. WE WOULD SOON COMPLETE A REVIEW OF THESE PROCEDURES. WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO MAKE OUR DECISIONS IN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME.

18. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID SWEDEN ALSO HOPES VERY MUCH THAT THE REVIEW OF US PROCEDURES WILL RESULT IN EXPEDITING THE PROCESS BUT ALSO HOPES THAT THE OUTCOME OF SUCH A REVIEW WOULD NOT BE A FURTHER TIGHTENING OF THE CRITERIA. TO UNDER SECRETARY COOPER'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE SWEDES DISCERNED THAT OUR PROCEDURES HAD BECOME WORSE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS THAN EARLIER. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER RESPONDED THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT SWEDISH COMPANIES WERE NOW EXPERIENCING GREATER DIFFICULTY. UNDER SECRETARY BENSON COMMENTED THAT THE INCREASED SOPHISTICATION OF WHAT WE ARE NOW SELLING MAY CAUSE A DELAY IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS BECAUSE IT IS SIMPLY MORE DIFFICULT TO ANALYZE THE
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IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED SALES INVOLVING HIGH TECHNOLOGY.

19. RETURNING TO THE DENIAL OF THE VIGGEN REQUEST, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER ENDED THE MEETING BY STATING HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD WOULD BE MUCH BETTER OFF IF THE US DECISION RESULTS -- AS IT APPEARS IT WILL -- IN INDIA OBTAINING THE JAGUAR AIRCRAFT FROM BRITAIN WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZING SWEDEN'S DEFENSE EFFORT.

20. MINISTER BURENSTAM LINDER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR WACHTMEISTER, SWEDISH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR THYBERG AND SWEDISH EMBASSY ECONOMIC COUNSELOR DINKELSPIEL. IN ADDITION TO THE SECRETARY, THE US PARTICIPANTS WERE: UNDER SECRETARY COOPER, UNDER SECRETARY BENSON, EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VINE, PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR ERICSON AND EUR/NE DIRECTOR FUNSETH. VANCE UNQTE VANCE

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QUOTE
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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 196722 ACTION STOCKHOLM DATED AUG 03:

QTE: S E C R E T STATE 196722

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PEPR, MASS, SW, IN, US, PK

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SWEDISH COMMERCE
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MINISTER ON US DENIAL OF VIGGEN SALE TO INDIA

1. SUMMARY: DURING A ONE-HOUR DISCUSSION AUGUST 2 WITH SWEDISH COMMERCE MINISTER BURENSTAM LINDER ON THE US DECISION NOT TO PERMIT SWEDEN TO CONCLUDE AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THE SALE OF CIGGEN AIRCRAFT TO INDIA, THE SECRETARY RECONFIRMED THIS DECISION, STATING WE COULD NOT APPROVE THE SALE BECAUSE WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON SOUTH ASIA. BURENSTAM LINDER RESTATED THE SWEDISH POSITION THAT: PAKISTAN ALREADYO HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT THAN THE VIGGEN -- INDIA HAS DECIDED TO OBTAIN A NEW AIRCRAFT WHETHER FR M SWEDEN OR SOME OTHER SOURCE -- AND THAT THE US DENIAL WILL SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE SWEDEN'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT. END SUMMARY.

2. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION THAT THE SECRETARY COULD SQUEEZE THIS MEETING IN HIS ALREADY VERY CROWDED SCHEDULE. BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION HE SAID THAT THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM POSED BY THE US DENIAL OF THE VIGGEN RE-EXPORT PERMIT FORMS PART OF A GENERAL PROBLEM FOR A COUNTRY SUCH AS SWEDEN WHICH HAS TO LIVE BY ITS EXPORTS. THEREFORE SUCH ISSUES TAKE ON GREAT IMPORTANCE. AS FOR THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF THE PRO-

POSED SALE OF VIGGEN AIRCRAFT TO INDIA, SWEDEN MAINTAINS A CERTAIN LEVEL OF EXPORTS OF SWEDISH-MANUFACTURED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. SWEDEN CANNOT MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE WITHOUT SUCH EXPORTS AND IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR SWEDEN TO MAINTAIN OR SUSTAIN ITS OWN DEFENSE EFFORT WITHOUT ITS PRESENT DOMESTIC DEFENSE INDUSTRY. SWEDEN APPLIES VERY STRICT EXPORT CONTROLS ON THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT ABROAD AND THEY
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REGULARLY TURN DOWN REQUESTS FOR EXPORT ORDERS. THIS RESTRAINT MEANS THAT SWEDEN HAS GREAT SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE US POLICY OF ARMS RESTRAINT AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE SUBCONTINENT. HOWEVER, WITHIN SWEDEN'S OWN VERY RESTRICTIVE RULES ON MILITARY EXPORTS, THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT CONCLUDED THAT AN EXPORT PERMIT FOR THE SALE OF THE VIGGEN TO INDIA SHOULD BE GRANTED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: (A) SWEDEN'S HISTORY OF COOPERATION WITH INDIA; (B) INDIA IS PRESENTLY THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY; (C) THE SALE OF THE VIGGEN CONSTITUTES A REPLACEMENT RATHER THAN AN ADDITION TO THE INDIAN AIR FORCE; (D) PAKISTAN ALREADY HAS IN ITS INVENTORY A MORE SOPHISTICATED AIRPLANE THAN THE VIGGEN; (E) INDIA HAS DECIDED TO OBTAIN A NEW JET AIRCRAFT WHETHER FROM SWEDEN, UK, FRANCE OR EVEN THE SOVIET UNION. BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF INDIA HAD TOLD HIM PERSONALLY THAT THERE WAS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THAT INDIA WOULD PURCHASE THE VIRGEN.

3, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID IT WAS SWEDEN'S UNDERSTANDING WHEN IT FIRST CONTRACTED TO BUY THE PRATT-WHITNEY ENGINE IN 1962 THAT IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME EXPORT OF THE AIRCRAFT IN WHICH IT WAS INSTALLED. THEREFORE SWEDEN HAD EXPECTED AN APPROVAL OF ITS REQUEST AND RECEIVED OUR NEGATIVE DECISION OF JULY 6 WITH GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT. SWEDEN OF COURSE WOULD NOT ARGUE THAT THE US SHOULD PERMIT A SWEDISH COMPANY TO SELL AN AIRPLANE IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT WOULD NOT PERMIT A US COMPANY TO SELL A COMPARABLE AIRPLANE. HOWEVER, THE EFFECT ON SWEDEN'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE SWEDISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY IS VERY SERIOUS. THE NEGATIVE US DECISION HAS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WHOLE FUTURE VIABILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT SWEDISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY. APPROVAL OF THIS SALE WOULD RELIEVE THE STRAIN ON
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SWEDEN'S DEFENSE BUDGET. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US NEGATIVE DECISION IF IT STANDS, WILL HAVE VERY

SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ABILITY OF SWEDEN TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT CAPACITY TO CONTINUE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR SUCCESSOR AIRCRAFT. THE US NEGATIVE DECISION, BY PREVENTING THE SALE OF VIGGEN TO INDIA, WILL ALSO REDUCE THE RESOURCES SWEDEN HAS AVAILABLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS OWN DEFENSE INDUSTRY AS WELL AS INCREASING THE COST OF SWEDISH DEFENSE. THE US DECISION, MOREOVER, RISKS HAVING AN ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION BECAUSE IT SUGGESTS THAT THE SWEDISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY IS NOT REALLY INDEPENDENT AND THEREFORE CONTINUED SWEDISH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HIGH DEFENSE EXPENDITURES COULD BE JEOPARDIZED. IF AS A RESULT OF THE US DECISION, SWEDEN IS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY, THERE WILL BE LESS RESOURCES GOING INTO THE MAINTENANCE OF SWEDISH AERIAL DEFENSE. SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION WOULD PROBABLY NOT PERMIT A SWEDISH GOVERNMENT TO SPEND THE SAME AMOUNT OF MONEY TO PURCHASE FOREIGN MILITARY AIRCRAFT AS IT IS FOR THE PURCHASE OF SWEDISH-MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT.

4. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER STATED FURTHER THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE NORTHERN FLANK IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT BUT POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND THAT THE PRESENT SWEDISH DEFENSE EFFORT IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION IN STABILIZING THE NORTHERN FLANK. HE MENTIONED FINLAND AS A COUNTRY AFFECTED BY THE MAINTENANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE SWEDISH DETERRENT. THEREFORE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE US DECISION EXTEND BEYOND ITS EFFECT ON ONE SWEDISH EXPORT ORDER. THE
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US NEGATIVE DECISION HAS ALREADY GIVEN RISE TO SOME BITERNESS AMONG THOSE INFLUENTIAL SWEDISH SECTORS WHO NOT ONLY SUPPORT A CONTINUED SWEDISH DEFENSE EFFORT BUT ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND SWEDEN. UNFORTUNATELY, THE US DECISION COMES AT A CRUCIAL POINT IN SWEDEN WHEN IMPORTANT DEFENSE DECISIONS ARE BEING MADE.

5. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE US DECISION TO DENY THE SWEDISH REQUEST WAS VERY DIFFICULT AND THAT WE HAD DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TO THOUGHT AND ANALYSIS BEFORE MAKING THE DECISION. HE RECALLED HIS DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SODER BEFORE WE CAME TO A DECISION AND HIS POINTING OUT TO HER THE DIFFICULTIES THE SWEDISH REQUEST POSED FOR US. HE REASSURED MR. BURENSTAM LINDER OF OUR SENSITIVITY TO THE SWEDISH POSITION AND OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REPERCUSSIONS IT WOULD HAVE IN SWEDEN. HE RESTATED

HOW THE US SEES THE PROBLEM, AS FOLLOWS: WE, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, ARE DOUBLY CONCERNED ABOUT ANY MOVES IN THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT AREA WHICH WOULD HAVE A DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON SOUTH ASIA. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE REVERSED THE PROPOSED SALE OF THE US A-7 JET AIRCRAFT TO PAKISTAN. WE THOUGHT SUCH A SALE WOULD BE A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR US TO TURN AROUND THIS DECISION. FOR THE US NOW TO AGREE TO A SALE WHICH WOULD GIVE INDIA A CAPABILITY WHICH WE ARE DENYING PAKISTAN WOULD BE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THIS DECISION AND WITH OUR POLICY. WE HAVE TOLD THE INDIANS THEY ARE MAKING A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN BUYING SUCH A MODERN AIRCRAFT FROM SWEDEN, FRANCE OR THE UK. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THEM THAT PAKISTAN WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BUY A NEW AIRCRAFT TO OFFSET THE INDIAN ACQUISITION. THE RESULT WILL BE THAT BOTH SIDES WILL SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE THIS NEW PENETRATION CAPACITY.

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FOR THESE REASONS WE REGRETFULLY DECIDED WE WOULD DISAPPROVE THE SWEDISH REQUEST. WE WISH WE COULD SEE ANOTHER WAY AROUND IT BUT WE DON'T. WE ARE FULLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE SWEDISH CONCERNS BUT WE SEE NO BASIS FOR MOVING AWAY FROM OUR DECISION. THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY BENSON NOTED THAT IN OUR JUDGEMENT PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE AN AIRCRAFT COMPARABLE OR SUPERIOR TO THE VIGGEN.

6. MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID HE WAS GLAD TO SEE RECOGNITION FOR THE USEFUL ROLE SWEDEN PLAYS IN STABILIZING THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN FLANK. CONSIDERING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE BOTH COUNTRIES ATTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE EFFORT IN THE NORTH HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD FIND SOME WAY OUT OF THIS IMPASSE. (IN AN ASIDE, MR. BURENSTAM LINDER SAID HE HAD SEEN A REPORT THAT THE US WAS CONSIDERING SELLING THE A-4 TO PAKISTAN. UNDER SECRETARY BENSON SAID THIS REPORT WAS WRONG AND THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT WE HAVE ONLY GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO SELLING THE F-5 TO PAKISTAN.) MR. BURENSTAM LINDER REPEATED THAT THE US NEGATIVE ATTITUDE HAS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDEN'S DEFENSE EFFORT, BOTH IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUN AND WILL CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN US-SWEDISH RELATIONS. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE US COULD DECLASSIFY THE PRATT-WHITNEY ENGINE WHICH HE NOTED HAS BEEN SOLD IN MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING INDIA, FOR USE IN CIVILIAN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. IF SWEDEN HAD KNOWN AT THE TIME THAT IT WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN EXPORT SALES OF A SWEDISH AIRCRAFT POWERED BY AN

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Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Previous Classification: SECRET
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Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1587752
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SWEDISH COMMERCE MINISTER ON US DENIAL OF VIGGEN SALE TO INDIA
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, SW, IN, US, PK
To: STOCKHOLM
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/bbd0f759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
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